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BOOK REVIEWS
By
Eugene F. Mooney.t Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967.
Pp. 186. $5.00.

FOREIGN SEIZURES: SABBATINO AND THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE.

In 1964 the Supreme Court held that United States courts were precluded from exercising jurisdiction over controversies involving the
validity of the act of a recognized foreign state within its own territory,
even where the act allegedly violates international law, unless the controversy in question can be adjudicated by the use of international standards
established by treaty or other unambiguous agreement. The decision was
made in the now celebrated case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:'
litigation arising out of the efforts of an American owned Cuban sugar
company to recover the proceeds of a sale of its property by the Cuban
Government after the Castro regime had expropriated its assets in retaliation for the reduction of the Cuban sugar import quota by the United
States.
The Sabbatino decision was not happily received by either the legal
profession or the business community. Substantial pressure was exerted
upon the Congress to reverse the result, and the Hickenlooper Amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 was the result. In the Amendment,
Congress provided that:
... [N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground
of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a
case in which a claim of title or other right is asserted by any
party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such
state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other
taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law, including the principles of
compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection:
Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable . . .
(2) in any case with respect to which the President determines
that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that
particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United
States.... 2

to
The principles of international law referred to include the duty "...
discharge its obligations under international law . . .including speedy
t Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2)

(Supp. II, 1967).
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compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof as required by international law. . .. ,3 On
remand, the district court judge before whom the Sabbatino litigation had
commenced, found the Amendment Constitutional and entered Summary
4
Judgment in favor of the American interests.
Thus was created the extraordinary situation of the Congress of the
United States purporting to overrule the Supreme Court opinion concerning the function of the judiciary within our over-all scheme of government.
The entire process, from initial litigation through the applicaton of the
Hickenlooper Amendment, has raised important questions as to the role
which domestic courts should play in contributing to the development of
international order.
This book, by a Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky, is a
brief in favor of the Amendment. It expresses the belief of its author that
international trade and development will be best served by allowing
American courts to examine the compatibility of seizures of American
property with the requirements of international law. Unfortunately, the
book fails to make a contribution to constructive discussion of the role of
courts in this sensitive area.
II
The book is inadequate for several reasons, of which the following interrelated factors should be specifically mentioned: the author's inability
to sufficiently respond to the praise of the Sabbatino opinion by competent
legal scholars; his failure to critically evaluate the standard of compensation adopted by Congress as a rule of international law; and a significant
absence of any genuine awareness of the standards adopted by the international community as a whole with respect to the power of states to
nationalize the property of aliens.
In Sabbatino the Supreme Court held that wider interests of national
policy required judicial abstention in the expropriation cases. It reasoned
that:
Following an expropriation of any significance, the Executive
engages in diplomacy aimed to assure that United States citizens
who are harmed are compensated fairly. Representing all claimants of this country, it will often be able, either by bilateral or
3. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1964).
4. Sub. nom., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (1965). Entry of final

judgment was suspended for sixty days in order to allow the President to file a suggestion that
application of the act of state doctrine was required by the foreign policy interests of the

United States. The executive branch informed the Court that "no such determination is
contemplated." Final judgment was then entered on November 15, 1965. See E. MooNEY,
FOREIGr SEIZuRES: SABBATIeO AND TEE AcT Or STATE DocTRiNq
123 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as MOONEY].
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multilateral talks, by submission of the United Nations, or by
the employment of economic and political sanctions, to achieve
some degree of general redress. Judicial determinations of invalidity of title can, on the other hand, have only an occasional
impact, since they depend on the fortuitous circumstance of the
property in question being brought into this country. Such decisions would, if the acts involved were declared invalid, often be
likely to give offense to the expropriating country; since the concept of territorial sovereignty is so deep seated, any state may
resent the refusal of the courts of another sovereign to accord
validity to acts within its territorial borders. Piecemeal dispositions of this sort involving the probability of affront to
another state could seriously interfere with negotiations being
carried on by the Executive Branch and might prevent or render
less favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise
be reached. Relations with third countries who have engaged in
similar expropriations would not be immune from effect.
The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of
whether the State Department has, as it did in this case, asserted
that the relevant act violated international law. If the Executive
Branch has undertaken negotiations with an expropriating country, but has refrained from claims of violation of the law of
nations, a determination to that effect by a court might be
regarded as a serious insult, while a finding of compliance with
international law would greatly strengthen the bargaining hand
of the other state with consequent detriment to American
interests.5
Able commentators have given their assent to that reasoning as being most
conducive to our own interest. Professor S. D. Metzger, for example, has
supported the court's rationale with the following illustration:
Suppose Ethiopia, for example, while not engaging in exchange
restrictions, nationalized cotton-ginning facilities, some of which
were American-owned, pursuant to a law and decree providing
for compensation in non-negotiable interest-bearing bonds payable in local currency in seven years. The Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations with Ethiopia, whose legal standards in the
expropriation field parallel those that the United States has with
other similarly situated countries, provides:
Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, including interests in property, shall receive
the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party. Such property
5. 376 U.S. at 431-432.
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shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it
be taken without the prompt payment of just and effective
compensation.
Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to
the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not
satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall at the request of
either High Contracting Party be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting
Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.
In all likelihood, the American owners of the ginning company, having exhausted without success their local legal remedies
in Ethiopia, claiming that the mode of compensation was unjust,
would have requested the State Department to espouse their
claim under the above-quoted treaty provisions. Let us assume
for the moment that the State Department had in fact decided to
do so, despite its substantial misgivings as to whether the Ethiopian decree was in fact inconsistent with the treaty. In all likelihood, the Department would proceed in a friendly way, not
charging "treaty violation" in shrill terms, but discussing with
Ethiopia, a friendly country in whose economic development we
have been much interested, ways and means whereby she might
provide convertible currency as compensation at some time
earlier than seven years. Perhaps this might be worked out
through a governmental purchase of Ethiopian cotton fabric
for further manufacture in a third country in whose development we were also interested.
Is it not reasonable to think that litigation in American courts
on the question whether the mode of compensation violated the
treaty would involve consequences similar to those graphically
described by the Court where the litigation involved a foreign
state act alleged to violate customary international law?6
7
Professor Mooney never really comes to grips with these arguments.
He relies heavily upon the dissent of Mr. Justice White,8 a dependence
which, while not without some justifications, is not the equivalent of
independent scholarship. Beyond that, he is content to characterize the
majority opinion in emotionally charged language.'

6. Metzger, Act of State Doctrine Redefined: -The Sabbatino Case, 1964 SuP. CT. REV.
223, 237-238 (P. Kurland ed.).
7. In addition to Professor Metzger's study, see R. FALK, TEE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964).
8. 376 U.S. at 439.
9. See, e.g., MooNEY at 94.
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A further weakness of the book is the author's failure to probe deeply
into the issue of an appropriate legal standard which can be applied by the
courts. It is true, as Professor Mooney argues, that basic standards of
governing the expropriation of alien properties have yet to be developed;
and it is further true, as he contends, that traditionally our common law
courts have creatively developed rules of law. Conceding, arguendo, that
domestic courts should be allowed to contribute to the formulation of
compensation standards, the more important job of the legal scholar is to
critically evaluate the standards which the judiciary attempts to create.
This Professor Mooney neglects to do.
In the present context the task is to examine not only the norms which
the courts create but, more accurately, to examine the norms which the
courts are commanded to apply by the Hickenlooper Amendment. In
controversies to which the Amendment is relevant, it becomes the obligation of the taking state to pay ".

.

. speedy compensation for such prop-

erty in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof,
as required by international law. .

. ."0

It is in the suggestion that inter-

national law requires full value that the standard is subject to criticism.
This position, which is also the view of the Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law," does not reflect a consensus adequate to justify its identification with international law. Its inadequacy lies in its assumption, implicit in the demand for full value, that legal ownership justly entitles a
person or corporation to the total intangible value of property taken by a
state. "Value" is an ambiguous term; nevertheless, the moral implications
of such a suggestion are not acceptable to many states that believe that
private ownership has contributed only a part of the total monetary or
economic worth of a given enterprise. And these states believe they are
entitled to decide the quantum of private contribution in any given situation. This does not mean that the power of states is unrestricted. The right
not to be arbitrarilydeprived of property is clearly recognized in international law. However, it is important to grasp the nuances of distinction12
between "full value" as a standard and a notion of "arbitrariness.'
Professor Mooney assumes that there is substantial agreement which
exists with respect to a basic norm that a taking must be compensated,
and that it remains for the Courts to determine the nuances of meaning
which the standard suggests. This is a defensible position but a more
critical examination of basic formulation is necessary before any headway
can be made in this area.
The author makes ample use of epithets such as "parochial" and "pro10. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (Supp. 1964).
11. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 187 (1965).

12. For a full development of these ideas, see Murphy, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 125, 136-138 (1966).
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vincial" in describing the Supreme Court's position as expressed in Sabbatino. It is tragic that he fails to consider how appropriately those terms
can be applied to his own position. For the book reflects an obsession with
the protection of American foreign investment, and that passion controls
his evaluation of the contribution to be made to international law by the
Sabbatino Amendment.
The insularity of his viewpoint is demonstrable in several respects. The
author not only ignores the myriad forms of cooperation which have been
developed by capital importing states to accommodate the expectations of
private investors,'" he never considers whether the interference with
world trade which judicial inquiry necessarily involves may outweigh the
"emotional" satisfaction to be derived by disgruntled corporations from
seizing goods moving in international commerce. More significant is the
absence of any reference to the attempts by the United Nations to adjust
the values at stake in these controversies through the declaration of guiding principles. 4
Passionate reaction to the phenomena of expropriation is to be expected
from those who have an immediate monetary stake in the outcome. Extreme advocacy by lawyers representing foreign investors and businesses
is understandable. But at the level of legal scholarship an effort on impartial objective analysis is essential. Without this effort from the community of scholars we can never expect the evolution of a workable world
order. 5
This book fails to approximate these requirements.
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr.*

TREATISE ON JUSTICE.

By Edgar Bodenheimer.'t New York: Philosophi-

cal Library, Inc., 1967. Pp. 314. $10.00.
Though the Treatise on Justice is a current work with much material
to aid in setting a trustworthy course through the tortured channels of
13. E.g., Bolivia: Foreign Investment Law, V INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 208 (1966);

Brazil and American & Foreign Power Co.: Contract for sale of utility properties, IV
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 72 (1965).

14. E.g., Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA. Res.
1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). The text is set forth in 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1963).
15. See Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-Gaps in
Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. Rav. 231 (1964).

* B.S., The College of the Holy Cross; LL.B., Boston College; LL.M., University of
Virginia. Professor of Law, Duquesne University.

t Professor of Law, University
Washington, J.U.D., Heidelberg.

of California, Davis. B.A., LL.B.,

University of
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today's maelstrom of domestic and international law and jurisprudence,
its classical references are not inappropriate since the author draws
heavily on the thought and wisdom of such ancients as Aristotle and
Plato, Aurelius and Aquinas, to enrich his modern presentation.
The emphasis on the deep wellsprings and origins of justice exhibited
by Professor Bodenheimer is not by any means confined to the past; it
extends with reinforced understanding to the most pressing of modern
problems, for example, the question of racial justice, or interracial relations. In our own era, the issue of racial justice has attained an overarching importance in the domestic politics of a number of nations and
has also cast its shadow into the domain of international relations. As the
author correctly points out, racial disturbances are inevitable when the
measuring rods used by the dominant groups in society stand in irreconcilable opposition to those of disfavored minorities.
Justice is defined as the norms of right conduct which people observe
toward each other, and as a necessary ingredient to a healthy society
is considered in relation to various other concepts, such as ethical values,
legality, morality, utility, and as a rational ideal. Throughout the work
the Golden Rule is emphasized as the author closely associates justice
with equal treatment, and the infraction of that principle constitutes
injustice. He also points out the curious fact that men's emotions are
more keenly aroused by acts of injustice than by the most careful administration of justice. Although much of the obvious is belabored in his
discussion that law and justice are not necessarily coterminous, the author
nevertheless considers the more timely question of disobedience to a
repugnant law. He intimates that the answer to this problem lies in the
broader field of ethics and morality.
Baffled by innumerably various definitions of justice, the author takes
refuge in the pious hope that as knowledge and social experience progress
divergent notions of justice will converge toward a considered unity,
"unless events in the international arena should plunge humanity down
into a new era of barbarism and ignorance. '
The author takes a paternalistic view of government albeit along
democratic and equalitarian lines. He nevertheless inveighs against the
intrinsic immorality of the "superman philosophy" with its consequent
mistreatment of underlings. In this connection he admits "inequality
of personal ability" but insists there is a duty of society to provide work
opportunities for all and, in fact equal opportunities for all. The author
speaks of the basic rights to social security as being among the postulates
of justice and dispels the argument that incapacity to find work is attributable to ineptitude and sloth. Unemployment, he asserts, should be
1. E. BODENHEINMER, TREATISE ON JUSTICE 114 (1967).

1967-1968]

BOOK REVIEWS

traced to general economic conditions. Continued intervention by the
government in the economic sphere is advocated on the ground that this
prevents abuses arising from avarice, and contributes to the greatest
good for the most people.
As to the best form of government the author favors democracy, but
has a lesson for our times in pointing out that democratic freedom may
degenerate into anarchy if short-term goals prevail which destroy the
moral stamina of society. He quotes Emil Brunner: "There are circumstances in which democracy can be the worst of all political orders,
namely when the people are not ripe for it, or when social conditions
are so disorganized that only a strong central will, a 'strong hand,' is
capable of curbing anarchy latent or manifest in the body social." 2
Political and social justice are concepts frequently not identical, with
political justice having to do with the nature and scope of the powers it
needs to support itself, and the latter dealing with the range of freedom
it can at the same time allow its subjects. The author finds that a power
structure which ignores its subjects' claims for justice cannot in the long
run maintain itself, but at the same time gives a surprisingly timely
warning for our present leaders: "A state which is powerless to fight disorder, civil strife and crime, to enforce the law, and to maintain its position in the international community becomes a caricature of a state."'
He quotes Hobbes with approval to the effect that the prime duty of a
state is to maintain internal peace and order.'
An eloquent plea for the promotion of freedom is made by Professor
Bodenheimer in his analysis that in such an atmosphere is created the
highest potential of the human mind to advance ideas for the betterment
of mankind.
Under the section heading "The Public Interest," Professor Bodenheimer confronts such blazing and controversial issues as group or ethnic
defamation versus free speech, rights of private property versus open
accommodations and housing laws. His views are worthy of close study
in their application to present day problems with solutions as the objective.
Taking up the universal and age-old question of crime and punishment, he first probes criminal responsibility, even bringing in the dilemma
of free will versus predetermination. Suffice it to say, Professor Bodenheimer is not especially strong in the field of causality as seen by modern
science. He favors free will on the ground that "people feel accountable"
and therefore upholds the punishment of criminals, while warning that
2. E. BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 200 (1945).

3. E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 1, at 117.
4. Id. at 118.
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there must be a proper relationship between the crime and its punishment,
or conversely, between a virtuous action and its reward. He ignores, or
does not know about, the predeterminationists' solution to the criminal's
defense that he was forced to commit this crime because he has no free
will-the answer that if the crime was inevitable the punishment is too.
In fact, some predestination-oriented philosophers contend that if criminals were taught this doctrine it in itself would be sufficient cause for their
reformation. He does have a word for some criminologists who want to
smooth the pathway of the rapist and the burglar, quoting Goodhart to
the effect, "A community which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer
may end by condoning the crime. '
Coming finally to the question of preserving the peace among the major
nations, Professor Bodenheimer correctly sums up by showing that justice
everywhere is menaced by the atomic threat, and that the dream of an
ideal social order may have to be postponed for centuries. As the author
correctly explains, if the pursuit of peace is not followed and men are
told and believe that order based on justice and reason is an illusion,
irrational behavior and chaos will increase in proportion to their delusionment.
Professor Bodenheimer pleads for the adoption of the Golden Rule in
international politics, and explains that avoidance of future wars must become the foremost concern of modern statecraft. He makes a final plea for
conscription for the conquest of nature to take the place of military
conscription, as advocated by William James, 6 and concludes that men
seeking a rational order and interested in preserving civilization from
total extinction must reconcile themselves to the probability that they
will have to endure "the most severe trials and tribulations before a
firm foundation can be laid for the reign of peace and justice throughout
the world."7
Harry M. Montgomery*
5. A.L. GOODIEART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MoRAL LAW 92-93 (1953).
6. W. JAMES, ESSAYS ON FAITH AND MoRALs 323 (1943).
7. E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 1, at 256.

* Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

